Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 28

Issue 2

Article 7

Fall 9-1-1971

Regulation Of Revolving Credit Service Charges

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Regulation Of Revolving Credit Service Charges, 28 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 386 (1971).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol28/iss2/7
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW

386

[Vol. XXVIII

It will of course remain to be seen whether these agreements, both in
terms of price-fixing and tie-ins, will be held to be violative of the antitrust
laws. However, in consideration of the foregoing examination of the
relevant antitrust law precedent, credit card issuers would be well advised
to examine their particular situations with a view toward prospective
adverse litigation either by individuals or by the federal government.
STEPHEN DARLEY ANNAND

REGULATION OF REVOLVING CREDIT SERVICE
CHARGES
No aspect of American retailing is more familiar today than the sale of
goods on revolving credit terms.' It has been estimated that in 1970,
revolving credit accounted for 30% of all retail sales, exclusive of
automobiles, groceries and liquor; in terms of dollar volume,
approximately $59 billion worth of business was done under this type of
2
plan.
These figures, striking in themselves, are more remarkable in view of
the fact that revolving credit is only about twenty-five years old, although
its historical antecedents go back much further. The sale of goods on open
credit has been traced back to Colonial times.2 Nor is the use of the credit
card, or its ancestor the credit coin, 4 a new development. Such devices
have been used to identify the customer who is authorized to purchase on
credit since before 1920. 5 Prior to World War I, however, credit sales
were usually made on a thirty-day credit basis, with the customer expected
t

Under a revolving credit plan, the customer is extended an open line of credit up to a
maximum dollar limit. He may make purchases on this line of credit at any time, generally
identifying himself by means of a credit card. Upon receiving a bill at the close of each
billing period, usually a month, for purchases made during that period, he has the option of
paying the account in full or of making a partial payment equal to or greater than a set
minimum percentage or dollar amount (typically 10 per cent or $10, whichever is greater), If
he elects to defer payment of part of the account, he will be assessed a service charge, most
often 1 1/% of the unpaid monthly balance. See Note, Regulation of Consumer Credit-The
Credit Card and the State Legislature,73 YALE L. J. 886, 887-88 (1964).
2
The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 4, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
3

NATIONAL RETAIL

MERCHANTS

ASSOCIATION,

ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

OF

DEPARTMENT STORE CREDIT 5 (1969) (hereinafter cited as NRMA STUDY).

"The credit coin was a small metal disc bearing the merchant's name and the customer's
account number. Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial Code. I
VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 218 n.I (1967).
5
Comment, The TripartiteCredit Card Transaction:A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
459, 460 (1960).
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to pay his account in full on the receipt of each monthly statement. 6 The
"revolving" feature, which allows the purchaser to make his payments in
installments, was introduced by Wanamaker's of Philadelphia in 1938,
although under this plan the credit privilege was still extended free of
charge. The development of today's revolving credit system was
completed in the years after the Second World War when retailers began
7
to impose a service charge on the unpaid balance of the account.
It is the imposition of this charge which has brought the revolving credit
1lan under heavy attack in the courts for the first time in its quartercentury of existence. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in October of
1970, held that that state's general usury statute" forbids revolving
creditors to assess a service charge of more than 12% a year or 1% a
month on the unpaid monthly balance Since this decision, trial courts in
Connecticut, s° Minnesota, 1" and South Dakota12 have followed the
Wisconsin court in holding that retailers could not impose charges in
excess of the maximum rates set by their respective usury statutes, 3 and
the Maine Bank Commissioner has issued a ruling to the same effect."
Similar challenges are reported to be pending in at least six other states. 5
TYPES OF REVOLVING CREDIT PLANS

Revolving credit plans fall into two distinct legal categories; the
differences between them, while not significant from the point of view of
INRMA STUDY at 7. According to data compiled by the Federal Reserve system, such
30-day charge accounts still constitute the largest single segment of open-end consumer
credit, although their importance relative to bank and department store credit cards has
declined. Hearings on H.R. 66 Before a Subcomm. of the House Select Comm. on Small

Business, 9 ist Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1970) (hereinafter cited as House Hearings).
7
NRMA STUDY at 7.
"Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.05(1) (Supp. 1970).
'State v. J.C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970).
'Donnelly v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
99,570
(Conn. Ct. C.P., Hartford County, Dec. 2, 1970).
"Montgomery Ward & Co. v. O'Neil, 3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
99,535
(Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, Apr. I, 1970).
"Rollinger v. J. C. Penney Co., 3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,609 (Cir. Ct.
S.D. Dec. 9, 1970).
"rhe maximum rate is 12 per cent in Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37-4
(1958), 8 per cent in Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01 (1956), and 10 per cent in
South Dakota, S.D. CODE § 54-3-7 (Supp. 1970).
"Maine Bank Comm'rs Ruling No. 1971-1, 3 CCH CON5UMER CREDIT GUIDE
99,546 (Mar. 30, 1971). The Maine interest limit is 12 per cent, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 3086 (1964).
Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana and New Jersey. Webster, Bank
Charge Cards-Recent Developments in Regulation and Operation, 26 Bus. LAW. 43
(1970); Wisconsin Supreme Court Service Charge Decision Against J.C. Penney Starts
Chain Reaction, 25 PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 26 (1970).
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the customer, may be of considerable importance in determining the
applicability of various forms of regulation." The older and simpler of the
two, the bipartite or "seller" revolving charge account, is created by a
single agreement between a retailer and his customer which establishes the
terms on which the customer may make purchases. This type of credit
generally involves the use of a credit card which is issued by the retailer
and will be honored by him. 17 The leading creditors under this type of
account are the large department store chains;"' $4.2 billion was
outstanding in department store revolving credit at the end of 1969."'
The second, more recent, 2" and more complex type of revolving charge
account is the tripartite or "lender" credit plan, of which BankAmericard
and Master Charge are the most widely-known examples. The lender
charge account involves three agreements among three parties: the
retailer, the customer, and the financial institution which initiates and
administers the plan. The latter issues the customer a credit card which the
retailer agrees to honor by selling its holder goods on credit, generally at
his regular cash price. In making a purchase with this card, the customer
signs a sales slip which evidences his debt. The issuer buys these
obligations from the retailer at a prearranged discount of from one to five
percent, 21 and bills the customer monthly. The customer, pursuant to his
agreement with the issuer, then has the option of paying in full or of
spreading his payments over several months and incurring a service
22
charge, just as he has under a seller revolving credit agreement.
"See note 98 infra.
"Dennis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.. -Tenn.
_ 446 S.W.2d 260 (1969) sets out a
typical seller-customer charge agreement. Id. at 262-63.
"'The familiar gasoline company credit cards have not during most of their history been
revolving credit cards in the true sense, in that payment has been due on receipt of the
monthly statement. During the past few years, however, some of the major companies have
converted their charge accounts to the revolving credit system. House Hearings at 238-46,
267.
'id. at 156.
2
1While bank credit card plans have been in existence since 1951, they were local and
generally unprofitable until the middle 1960's. Id. at 258-59. The "travel and
entertainment" credit cards, of which Diners Club is the oldest and best known, have been
operating since 1949. Like the traditional gasoline company credit card, however, these are
not revolving credit cards. The cardholder pays a flat yearly service fee rather than a charge
computed on his unpaid monthly balance, and is expected to pay his account in full each
month. Id. at 194-215.
2
The bank credit card issuer thus has two distinct sources of income: the service charge
assessed on the customer who extends payment, and the discount charged the retailer.
22
See note I supra. For a more detailed description of the mechanics of the lender
revolving credit plan, see Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and the Uniform Commercial
Code, I VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 218, 224-32 (1967); Robinson, New Developments in Retail
Financing, 8 KAN. L. REV. 554, 567-74 (1960); Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card
Transaction:A Legal Infant. 48 CALIF. L. REV. 459, 463-65 (1960).
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USURY AND THE TIME PRICE DOCTRINE

The history of governmental efforts to forbid the loan of money at an
interest rate in excess of an imposed maximum can be traced back for
thousands of years.Y Despite general agreement by modern commentators
that such laws are ineffective and undesirable, 4 efforts in this country to
repeal them have met with almost total failure.25 Every state but one has
some form of usury statute today.2 6 The maximum rate set by the great
majority of these laws is 12% per year or less.27
The potential impact of these statutes on an economy in which $120
billion in consumer credit is outstanding 5 is enormous. The great bulk of
credit transactions, however, have been brought within a series of
exceptions, both judicially and legislatively created, to the usury laws. 29 In
the case of retail credit sales, the seller has generally been permitted to
impose a finance charge in excess of the statutory ceiling through the
operation of the time price doctrine.
This doctrine was first enunciated in the 1827 English case of Beele v.
Bidgood30 and adopted in 1861 by the United States Supreme Court in
Hogg v. Ruffner.3 1 In the latter case the court stated the doctrine as
follows:
[I]t is manifest that if A propose to sell to B a tract of land for
$1 0,000 in cash, or for $20,000 payable in ten annual installments,
and if B prefers to pay the larger sum to gain time, the contract
cannot be called usurious. A vendor may prefer $100 in hand to
double the sum in expectancy, and a purchaser may prefer the
greater price with the longer credit. . . . Such a contract has none
23See. e.g., Benfield, Money, Mortgages,and Migraine-TheUsury Headache, 19 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 819, 822-26 (1968); Bernstein, Background of a Gray Area in Law: The
Checkered
Careerof Usury, 51 A.B.A.J. 846 (1965).
2
1E.g., Benfield, supra note 21; Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application of
Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L. REV. 327 (1967); Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit
Code: An Economist's View, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 491 (1969).
'Benfield, supra note 21, at 826.
'IThe lone exception is New Hampshire. For a survey of state usury statutes, see B.
CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 140-43 (1965). Since this survey was
published, Massachusetts, which did not then have usury statutes, has passed such
legislation. See note 27 infra.
Trrwo states set maximum rates which do not restrict most transactions. MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 27, § 49 (Supp. 1970) (20 per cent); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 6-26-2 (1956) (21 per
cent).
2Address by Basil J. Mezines, Executive Director, Federal Trade Commission, before
the Practising Law Institute, New York City, Oct. 23, 1970. A copy of this address is on file
in the Washington and Lee Law School Library.
nShanks, supra note 22, at 331-34.
"108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827).
1166 U.S. (I Black) 115 (1861).
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of the characteristics of usury; it is not for the loan of money, or
32
forbearance of a debt.
The distinction drawn in these cases between the sale of goods on credit
and the making of a loan to the buyer in order to enable him to make the
purchase is recognized today as unfounded in economic reality.33 The
holding in Hogg v. Ruffner has been explained on the ground that
installment financing was a novelty at the time the case was decided, and
its implications were not then apparent.34 Nevertheless, the doctrine
continued to be applied after modern patterns of consumer credit
financing had emerged. A leading case is General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Weinrich,3 decided in 1924. Weinrich bought a used automobile,
trading in his old car and giving the dealer a promissory note for the
balance of the "time price," which was $51 greater than the cash price.
The dealer shortly thereafter sold the note to GMAC. Despite the readily
apparent nature of this now-familiar transaction, the court held that
Weinrich was "a purchaser, and not a borrower, and consequently...
not within the intendment and protection of the usury laws."'3
Despite its abandonment in a few states, 37 the time price doctrine
remains very much alive today,38 quite possibly due in part to a feeling by
the courts that adherence to it, even in defiance of economic realities, is
preferable to the extension of the general usury statutes.39 That the courts
are prepared to look to the substance of the transaction where the question
of usury is not involved is illustrated by the recent Virginia case of General
40
Electric Credit Corp. v. Lunsford,
in which the maker of an installment
note secured by a deed of trust, which had been given for the purchase of a
shell house, sought to anticipate payment as permitted by a clause in the
deed. Construction of the clause was governed by a statute which provided
that the debtor could anticipate payment "by the payment of principal
and interest to the date of such anticipated payment only."', The holder of
32d. at 118-19.
"E.g., Benfield, supra note 21, at 845-46; Shay, supra note 22, at 508-11.
UWarren, Regulation of Finance Chargesin Retail Instalment Sales, 68 YALE L. J. 839,
842-43 (1959).
5218 Mo. App. 68, 262 S.W. 425 (1924).
"262 S.W. at 430.
3"Notes 41-44 and accompanying text infra.
"For examples of recent decisions reaffirming the doctrine, see United Acceptance
Corp. v. Joiner, 280 Ala. 605, 196 So. 2d 720 (1967); Petersen v. Philco Finance Corp., 91
Idaho 644, 428 P.2d 961 (1967); Schauman v. Solmica Midwest, Inc., 283 Minn. 437, 168
N.W.2d 667 (1969); Steffenauer v. Mytelka & Rose, Inc., 87 N.J. Super. 506, 210 A.2d 88
(Super. Ct. 1965), affd, 46 N.J. 299, 216 A.2d 585 (1966).
"Benfield, supra note 21, at 846.
40209 Va. 743, 167 S.E.2d 414 (1969).
41
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-60(6) (Repl. Vol. 1969).
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the note contended that the difference between the cash price of the house
and the amount of the note was not interest but a time price differential.
Conceding that the time price doctrine was recognized in Virginia, the
court nevertheless held that the term "interest" should be construed more
broadly for the purposes of the statute in question than for the purposes of
2
the usury law, and sustained the debtor's right of anticipation.1
The first break in the previously universal acceptance of the time price
doctrine came in 1952, when the Arkansas Supreme Court declined to
hold usurious an installment sales contract which had been entered into in
reliance on prior decisions upholding the doctrine, but warned that it
would scrutinize future transactions for their economic substance.13 This
warning was realized in the 1957 case of Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck &Co.,4
which effectively abolished the time price doctrine in Arkansas and
subjected all credit transactions in that state to its constitutional interest
2
ceiling of 10%.1
Within a few years thereafter a series of Nebraska cases,
culminating in Lloyd v. Gutgsell,6 developed the rule that any transaction
where a time price was calculated by applying a set of rates or tables to the
cash price would be considered a loan or forbearance within the purview
of the usury statute. The Nebraska legislature, however, responded
promptly to these decisions by enacting a series of statutes specifically
authorizing the imposition of higher finance charges on various types of
7
retail credit sales.'
In passing this legislation Nebraska joined the great majority of states
which have so-called retail installment sales acts, which govern the finance
charges which may be assessed by a retail seller on a conventional
installment sale.4 8 These statutes generally contain disclosure
requirements and allow minimum charges which evidently render them
inappropriate with respect to a revolving credit transaction. 9 Writing in
1964, a student commentator pointed out that the prevalence of these acts
had apparently curtailed the spread of the decisions challenging the time
price doctrine, but predicted that the revolving charge account, a credit
sales device not within the scope of the acts, might impel courts to revive
the trendA0 In view of its several substantial differences from the
12209 Va. at 748, 167 S.E.2d at 418-19 (1969).
"Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973 (1952).
"228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1957).
2
" ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13.
"175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963).
"Included was a statute validating seller revolving credit service charges. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 45-207 (1968); see Appendix A.
"For an exhaustive summary and analysis of these statutes, see B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN
CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 91-123 (1965).
"See Note, Revolving Credit, 55 Nw. U.L. REv.330, 343-44 (1960).
'Note, Regulation of Revolving Credit-The Credit Card and the State Legislature, 73
YALE L.J. 886, 898 (1964).
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prototypical time price sale,51 the term "uncertain," recently used to
describe the status of the revolving credit transaction under the time price
52
doctrine, seems entirely appropriate.
Nevertheless, the revolving credit system survived its first two
challenges in the courts. In Uni-Serv Corp. v. Commissionerof Banks,53
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the operator of a
lender revolving credit plan was not within the scope of that state's Small
Loan Act because the plan came under the time price doctrine. And in
Dennis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. , 4 the Tennessee court rejected the
argument that a statute authorizing revolving creditors to impose a 11/2
per cent monthly service charge was invalid as violative of a provision of
the Tennessee constitution forbidding the legislature to permit interest
rates in excess of 10 per cent.56 The court pointed to the nearly unanimous
acceptance of the time price doctrine in holding that the service charge was
not interest; 57 the conceptual difficulties raised by the peculiar nature of
the revolving credit sale were not discussed.
In State v. J.C. Penney Co.,58 the Wisconsin court emphasized these
difficulties in declining to exempt revolving credit sales from the operation
of the usury laws. The most obvious problem is the absurdity of saying
that a revolving credit transaction is a sale at a "time price" which cannot
be established when the sale is made. 59 This would in itself seem sufficient
basis for the decision. The court went further, however, citing ten other
differences between the revolving credit sale and the traditional time price
transaction described in Hogg v. Ruffner."0 Among these was the fact that
the service charge is the product of the application of a fixed percentage to
the balance of the account, 6' a statement which is true of virtually every
type of modern credit sale. It would thus appear that the Wisconsin court
may follow the Arkansas and Nebraska decisions in virtually abolishing
the time price doctrine.62
It is hard to deny that the approach taken in this decision, and the result
reached, are logically sound; yet it may be questioned whether the opinion
51

See note 59 and accompanying text infra.
52Symposium-The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Its Effects on Minnesota
Laws, 55 MINN. L. REv.523, 543 (1971).
0349 Mass. 283, 207 N.E.2d 906 (1965).
... Tenn. _ 446 S.W.2d 260 (1969).
rsTENN. CODE ANN. § 47-11-104 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
"4TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
-1446S.W.2d at 263-65.
ms48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970).
-1179N.W.2d at 653.
666 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861); text accompanying note 29 supra.
"1179 N.W.2d at 652-53.
2
Notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
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reaches the real underlying issue in the case. In the words of Professor
Homer Kripke:
Far too much paper has been wasted arguing the merits of this
doctrine as a legal matter, for the question is inherently not
susceptible of a rational answer. A legal concept like interest or
usury is not a natural phenomenon the contours of which can be
measured with a calipers, but a human construction as broad or as
narrow as man says it is. If man says that the concept of usury
includes time price differentials, then it does. If man says the
613
contrary, then it does not. So much for the law.
The legal questions involved in the decision whether to apply the usury
laws to revolving charge accounts are neither of great difficulty nor of
great significance. What would appear to be of more importance are the
practical complexities of this area of consumer credit and the economic
implications of its regulation.
CALCULATION OF THE SERVICE CHARGE

The most basic objection to the use of the general usury statute to
regulate revolving credit service charges is that the stated rate of charge is
a nominal rate only, which will seldom if ever describe the actual cost to
the customer of the credit privilege.64 The primary reason for this
discrepancy is that under the methods of computation. most generally in
use, 65 the service charge is computed on the basis of the unpaid balance of
the account on a fixed day of the billing cycle, regardless of the date on
which purchases and payments are made. This results in a wide variation
from cycle to cycle and from customer to customer in the actual rate paid.
To take an oversimplified example for purposes of illustration, assume
that one customer makes a $100 purchase thirty days before the close of
the billing cycle and another makes the same purchase on the day before
the cycle ends, and that each is assessed a 1 /2per cent service charge. If
each pays his bill on the following day, the second customer will have paid
$1.50 for the use of $100 for two days, or an effective annual rate of
approximately 270 per cent, while the actual rate charged the first
customer will approach the nominal 18 per cent.66 Thus, the actual cost of
credit to the customer can only be computed individually and after the
fact.67
3

Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation:A Creditor-OrientedViewpoint, 68 COLUM. L.

REv. 445,452 (1968); see Shanks, supra note 22, at 343-44.
"NRMA STUDY at 24.
"See notes 69-74 and accompanying text infra.
"Note, Revolving Credit, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 330, 333 (1960).
"7Hearings on S.5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 201 (1967) (hereinafter cited as
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The example given would seem to indicate that the revolving credit
system is heavily loaded in favor of the creditor. On the average, however,
the bias is downward from the nominal rate because of the universal
practice of not assessing a service charge until the second billing date
following each purchase, thus allowing the consumer to avoid any service
charge by paying for each purchase within twenty-five days after being
billed." A considerable number of customers do make a habit of paying in
full each month, thus treating the revolving account as a conventional
thirty-day charge account and enjoying interest-free credit.69 Even when
only the accounts which do incur service charges are considered, the net
effect of this "free period" is to drive the average annual rate below the
70
nominal rate.
The general usury laws also fail to address themselves to the crucial
matter of the method used by the creditor to compute the balance on
which the service charge is due. There are three of these in general use, of
which the most common, 71 and the least favorable to the customer, is the
so-called previous balance method. 72 Under this method of computation,
if there is any balance remaining unpaid in an account at the close of a
billing cycle the service charge is assessed on the balance outstanding at
the beginning of the cycle, regardless of any payments or credits to the
account during the period. The disadvantages of this method from the
consumer's point of view are apparent; where it is used, it is entirely
possible for a customer to pay a greater annual rate than the nominal 18
per cent.

73

Senate Hearings). A sample of 40 active accounts prepared by J. C. Penney Co. for these
hearings showed that the actual rates paid for the use of credit over a year's time ranged from
a high of 17.10 per cent to a low of .83 per cent. Id. at 217.
'8 NRMA STUDY at 24. This practice is a result of the origin of the revolving charge
account in the traditional 30-day open account, upon which no service charge was imposed.
When some retailers attempted to assess a charge on their revolving accounts from the date
of purchase, they aroused resistance on the part of customers who were accustomed to
paying for their purchases at the end of each month without being charged for the privilege.
Id. at 24-25.
"Thirteen of the forty active accounts in the sample cited in note 65 supra had incurred
no service charge in the course of a year. Senate Hearingsat 217. Bank of America officials
have estimated that 40 per cent of BankAmericard holders do not extend their balances.
House Hearings at Il1l.
7
°Fifteen stores surveyed by the NRMA showed an actual return of 14.41 per cent on
their investment in accounts that did incur service charges. NRMA STUDY at 24.
BankAmericard's average yield is "somewhat less than 14 per cent." House Hearings at
112.
7
Of the nation's five leading retailers, three use this method of computation. The Wall
Street Journal, Mar. 4, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
72
The descriptions of these methods, and the nomenclature applied to them, are derived
from Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Credit Policy Statement No. 4, May 7, 1970.
nFor an illustration see Senate Hearingsat 202.

1971]

NOTES

The second method of computation involves the use of the average daily
balance, which is computed by dividing the sum of the balances
outstanding on each day of the billing cycle by the number of days in the
cycle. This average daily balance method thus gives credit for payments
according to the dates on which they were made. For example, if $50 were
paid on the sixteenth day of a 30-day cycle on an opening balance of $100,
the service charge would be assessed on the average daily balance of $75,
while the same payment made on the twenty-first day would result in an
average daily balance of $83.33. This method comes closer than any other
to eliminating the inequalities in the rates charged different customers. If
the free payment period were eliminated, as one commentator has urged, 74
each customer would be charged at virtually the nominal rate.
The final method of computation is the adjusted balance method, under
which the customer receives credit for all payments and returns during the
month before the service charge is computed. Of the three methods, this is
obviously the most favorable to the consumer. If a payment of $50 is
made halfway through the billing period on a $100 opening balance, the
service charge assessed under the adjusted balance method will be half that
paid under the previous balance method. As the hypothetical payment
becomes larger, the difference in result becomes even more striking. 75 As
applied to the sample account in Appendix B over a three-month period,
the previous balance method produced a service charge of $1.47, an
annual rate of 15.7 per cent, while the yield under the adjusted balance
7
method was $.88 or 9.5 per cent.
The implications of the foregoing considerations from the point of view
of the creditor who has been brought under the general usury statutes and
seeks to minimize his losses of revenue are manifold. If he has been using
the adjusted balance method, he can simply change over to the previous
balance method and probably suffer little or no loss. A monthly rate of I
per cent, applied by means of the previous balance method to the sample
account, 77 produces a greater return than the 1 per cent rate computed
78
on the adjusted balance.
7
Ziegel, Consumer Credit Regulation: A CanadianConsumer-Oriented Viewpoint, 68
COLUI. L. REv. 488, 510 (1968).
75
Monthly disclosure to the consumer of the method used in computing service charges,
as required by the Federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1637(a)(2) (Supp. V 1965-69),
had led to a heavy volume of complaint to the Federal Trade Commission concerning the use
of the previous balance method. Address by Basil J. Mezines, note 26 supra. Senator
Proxmire of Wisconsin has introduced legislation in the Senate which would require
creditors to use the adjusted balance method. S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
19Senate Hearings at 202. It should be noted that the sample was prepared by J.C.
Penney, which uses the adjusted balance method. Penney's terms the previous balance
method the "beginning balance method."
7See note 74 supra.
7
sThe net service charge over the three months would be $.97, compared with $.88
produced by the adjusted balance method and the higher rate.
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Nor is the creditor who is already using the previous balance method
necessarily foreclosed by the usury statutes from attempting to maintain
his service charge revenue at or near its former level. The abolition of the
free payment privilege and the imposition of a service charge from the date
of purchase would presumably increase his rate of return enormously." As
a practical matter, this is unlikely because of the resistance it would
almost certainly arouse in his customers,80 but if the usury laws are taken
to speak only to the nominal rate it would be entirely permissible. On the
other hand, if what is proscribed is the imposition of an effective rate in
excess of the statutory ceiling, it should be possible to continue to
calculate service charges on the basis of the 1 2 per cent monthly rate if a
ceiling could be imposed to prevent the charge of any single account from
exceeding the statutory maximum. Another possibility, which would
minimize the impact of the usury statute even more, would be to abandon
the nominal rate entirely and calculate the service charge on an individual
monthly basis in order to yield the maximum permitted annual rate.
Whether or not creditors do in fact attempt to make use of these or
similar devices to minimize the effect of lowered rate ceilings, the fact that
they are apparently available is significant in itself. It suggests that the J.
C. Penney decision and its progeny do not represent a very desirable
approach to the regulation of revolving credit service charges, since the
usury statutes on which they rest do not speak to the complexities of
revolving credit.
THE COST OF CREDIT

Apparently underlying the decisions which have held the 18 per cent
annual rate usurious is the assumption that this rate in fact yields an
unreasonable profit to the retailer or the bank which imposes it. Only the
Connecticut court, however, has articulated this premise:
The consumer is a sitting duck for the powerful guns of
corporate business and financial interests..
The use of the credit card has opened a new field for financing
with the cost burden borne by the consumer. The sale has become
secondary to the financing thereof, so that the merchandisers make
more money charging interest on the account than is made in the
sale of their wares. In spawning the open and unlimited credit
system, we have given birth to a whole new class of "usurers" who
have openly flaunted [sic] the statutory interest limit . . .
7

See note 64 and accompanying text supra.

80See note 66 supra.

"Donnelly v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
(Conn. Ct. C.P., Hartford County, Dec. 2, 1970).

99,570

1971]

NOTES

As might be expected, this contention is vigorously disputed by
retailers, who contend that revolving credit service charges do not pay for
the cost of administering the accounts. The major document supporting
this contention is a study undertaken in 1968 by the accounting firm of
Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart on behalf of the National Retail Merchants
Association. 2 Of fifteen stores surveyed, ten large (over $10 million
annual gross sales) and five small (under $5 million), only four showed a
profit on their revolving credit operations.3 The large stores fared better
than the smaller outlets, losing less than 2 per cent on the average
compared with more than 3 per cent for the latter; overall, the fifteen
stores in the sample lost an average of 2.31 per cent.'
Figures released by individual retailers tell a similar story. J. C. Penney
Co. contends that it lost $23 million on its overall credit operations in
1969.8 Montgomery Ward, which, unlike J.C. Penney, uses the previous
balance method, reports that its credit plans "vary from a modest profit
to a modest loss ....
It is not contended, of course, that retailers will therefore abandon the
practice of extending credit, which presumably pays for itself amply by
increasing gross sales.8 7 Assuming, however, that the industry figures are
approximately correct and that the prevailing service charge of 1 / per
cent monthly at best does little more than pay for the costs of revolving
credit, it is readily apparent that a reduction in the permissible rates, if it
cannot be neutralized by any of the methods outlined above, will create a
sizeable deficiency in revenue which retailers will attempt to recoup.89 The
simplest and most effective means of doing so will be to raise the cash
price of their merchandise.9 0
There is considerable empirical evidence that this is indeed what has
taken place where monthly rates substantially below 1 / per cent are in
effect. A field study of retail appliance prices in Arkansas, where a
constitutional maximum annual rate of 10 per cent has been applied to
time sales since 1957,91 showed that prices in Arkansas were consistently
higher than those charged for comparable merchandise in neighboring
R2NRMA STUDY.
131d. at 35, 63.
"'Id.at 63.
'"The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 4, 197 1, at i, col. 6.

"Wd.
"8The president of Montgomery Ward has estimated that sales of certain items would
drop 35 to 50 per cent if credit were discontinued. Id. at 13, col. 1.
"Notes 75-78 and accompanying text supra.
"'NRMA STUDY at 15.

"Id.
"Notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
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states.92 A recent survey of merchants in Washington, where a 12 per cent
maximum went into effect in January of 1969,13 showed that 56 per cent
had raised prices an average of 5 per cent specifically to counteract the
loss of service charge revenue.94
As a result the cash customer helps to pay for the service afforded the
credit customer.9 5 There is no automatic presumption that this is an
undesirable result; 91it could well be argued that it serves a redistributive
function. It would appear, however, that these considerations should be
taken into account in determining the level at which maximum rates
should be set. It is further submitted that legislatures are better suited
than courts for the determination of public policy in this area.
EXISTING AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION

State legislatures have in fact spoken to the problem of revolving charge
account service charges with increasing frequency in recent years. A
survey in 1965 showed thirteen states with some kind of legislation
specifically addressed to revolving credit.9 7 As of this writing, the number
has increased to well over thirty. 9
Only about half these states, however, regulate both seller and lender
charge accounts. Many of the statutes passed prior to the mid-1960s,
when the bank charge card came to prominence,99 contain terms like that
of the Delaware act, which defines "retail installment account" as
an account established by an agreement entered into in this State,
pursuant to which the buyer promises to pay, in installments, to a
retail seller, his outstanding balance incurred in retail installment
sales. ....1.
0
By its terms this provision would not appear to apply to a lender charge
account, in which the promise to pay is made to the financing institution
' 2Lynch, Consumer Credit at Ten Per Cent Simple: The Arkansas Case, 1968 U. ILL. L.
FORUM 592, 599-605.
'3WASH. REV.CODE § 63.14.130 (Supp. 1970).
"The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 4, 1971, at 13, col. 1.A further possible result of
lowered maximum rates, reported by The Wall Street Journal to be taking place at one
Wisconsin store since the J.C. Penney decision, is the denial of credit cards to some
applicants who would formerly have received them. Id. at 13, col. 2.
"See Lynch, supra note 90, at 606.
"See NRMA STUDY at 16.
B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 102 n.151 (1965).
"sFor a survey of these statutes and the maximum rates they permit, see Appendix A
infra.
"Note 18 supra.
'"DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4301 (Supp. 1968) (emphasis added). This statute was
passed in 1960.
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rather than to the seller.' A few states, on the other hand, have statutes
which apply only to lender credit plans. 02
Every statute except that of Kentucky0 3 sets a basic maximum rate for
service charges, most often 1 2 per cent. Higher rates, up to 2 per cent, are
authorized in several states,0 4 while six set lower ceilings. 0 5 Almost half
provide for a sliding scale, under which the basic rate is charged up to a
fixed dollar amount and a lower rate applies to the excess. This sliding
scale presumably causes the service charge to reflect more accurately the
actual costs of handling the account, many of which are fixed and do not
increase with the size of the balance.
A second method of distributing these fixed costs more accurately is
authorized by several states, which permit a revolving creditor to impose a
minimum service charge on all accounts on which the charge as computed
is less than the minimum amount. 0 7 This charge, where authorized, ranges
from 250 to $1.1" Even where higher charges are permitted, however, the
Federal Truth in Lending Act' 09 provides a strong incentive for creditors
not to assess a charge in excess of 50¢. Under this law, if a minimum
charge of 50 or less is imposed, that month's statement may disclose the
nominal rather than the effective rate of the charge," 0 while if the
minimum charge is more than 50¢ the effective rate must be computed
and disclosed."'
"'See Comment, The Tripartite Credit Card Transaction:A Legal Infant, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 459, 497-98 (1960); Note, Regulation of Installment Credit Cards, 35 U. CIN. L. REv.
424, 442-45 (1966). More recent statutes generally avoid this difficulty. For example, the
Virginia statute speaks of "[a]ny seller or lender engaged in the extension of consumer credit
under an open-end credit or similar plan. . ." VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-362 (Supp. 1970).
"'rhese states are Arizona, South Carolina and South Dakota. See Appendix A.
'"Kentucky authorizes the assessment of a service charge in excess of the usury ceiling,
but imposes no maximum rate. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371.300(3) (1969).
'Illlinois (seller only), Kansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah (seller
only) and Wyoming (seller only). See Appendix A. There is some evidence that market forces
tend to keep rates down to the prevailing I 2 per cent even where higher rates are permitted:
two Ohio banks, responding to a Congressional inquiry in early 1970, reported charging 1
per cent despite that state's authorization of a rate of 2 per cent on the first $200. House
Hearings at 229, 237.
IS'Arizona, Idaho (lender only), Oklahoma (lender only), Pennsylvania, Washington
and Wyoming (lender only). See Appendix A.
'"NRMA STUDY at 26; ef State v. J. C. Penney Co., 48 Wis. 2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641,
653 (1970).
"'Under legislation currently pending in the U.S. Senate this practice would be made
illegal. S. 652, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
"'See Appendix A. Where the minimum charge is $1, assuming a rate of 1 per cent,
any customer with an outstanding balance of less than $66.66 will pay that amount; where it
is 250, 250 will be charged on all balances under $16.66.
115 U.S.C. §§ 1601-77 (Supp. V 1965-69).
"615 U.S.C. § 1638(5) (Supp. V 1965-69).
'15 U.S.C. §§ 1606(a)(2), 1637(c) (Supp. V 1965-69). See Brandel, Open End Credit
Disclosure,26 Bus. LAW. 815, 820 (1971).
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With regard to the method of billing, most of the statutes apparently
permit, either tacitly 12 or explicitly,"' the use of any of the three principal
systems. Massachusetts in 1970 amended its statute to require the use of
either the average daily balance method or the adjusted balance method, "4
and the Arizona statute can be interpreted as imposing a similar
requirement." 5 New Mexico, perhaps through careless draftsmanship,
appears to require the use of the previous balance method."'
THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1968 approved the Uniform Consumer Credit Code," 7 which has since
been adopted in Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming. The
UCCC treats seller and lender revolving credit plans separately and sets
different maximum rates for each. The creditor under a seller account is
permitted to charge 2 per cent on the first $50011, and 1 per cent on the
excess."' Under a lender revolving credit plan, however, the permitted
charge is a flat 1 2 per cent. 20 A 500 minimum charge is permitted on
both types of account.' 2' Any of the three methods of computation is
permitted, 22 but the creditor must disclose to the debtor the method
used. 2
Despite its name, the UCCC has failed to produce uniformity in service
charges in the states which have adopted it. Only Utah did not alter the
rates as they were drafted. 2 In Indiana, the maximum rate enacted for
2

" E.g., PA. STAT. tit. 69, §§ 1901, 1904 (Supp. 1970); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-11-104
(Repl. Vol. 1964).
"'OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1107.27 (Baldwin Supp. 1969).
n.MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 255D, § 27(c)(3) (Supp. 1970).

"'The statute requires the charge to be calculated "as of the regular monthly billing date
or on the actual daily balances outstanding." ARIZ. REV.STAT. ANN. § 6-254(a)(3) (Supp.
1970).
"'N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-16-3(c) (Supp. 1969).
"'Hereinafter cited as UCCC.
"'UCCC § 1.106 provides that certain dollar amounts, of which this is one, shall change
from time to time with the U.S. Department of Labor's Consumer Price Index. In
accordance with this provision, Utah has raised this amount to $550. I CCH CONSUMER
CREDIT GUIDE 5640 (1971).

"'UCCC § 2.207(3).
1-UCCC § 3.201(4)(a). The reason for the difference in rates is presumably that the
lenders have a second source of revenue in the discount charged merchants on the purchase
of customers' obligations. Note 20 supra;see Shay, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code:
An Economist's View, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 491,506-07 (1969).
'21UCCC § § 2.207(4), 3.201(4)(c).
'nUCCC § § 2.207(2), 3.201(4)(a).
'"UCCC §§ 2.310(l)(b), (2)(0, 3.309(!)(b), (2)(0.
INUTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-2-207, 70B-3-201 (Supp. 1969); see note 116 supra.
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seller revolving credit plans is 1 2 per cent per month.'2 Oklahoma and
Wyoming lowered the maximum rates to 1 1/2 per cent on seller accounts1 2
and 5/6 per cent on lender accounts. 2 And in Idaho, the maximum is 1
2
per cent on seller accounts 121 and 1 1/ per cent on lender accounts. 1
CONCLUSION

Together with the growth of revolving credit has come a strong trend
toward regulation of the service charges on revolving charge accounts.
There seems little room for doubt that this trend will continue; the
question at which this note has been directed is the possible form which
this regulation will take. It is submitted that insufficiency of the general
usury statutes to deal with the complex problems presented by the
revolving charge account should limit the spread of the approach taken by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the J.C. Penney case. The proper arena
for the resolution of the competing interests involved would appear to be
the legislature.
HARVEY

L.

HANDLEY I II

'Mlnd. Laws 1971, S.B. 5, § 2.207 (1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 5331 (Mar. 30,
1971).
'3'OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 2-207 (Supp. 1969); Wyo. Laws 1971, ch. 191, § 2.207
(ICCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 5341 (Mar. 30, 1971)).
'2OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 3-201(4) (Supp. 1969); Wyo. Laws 1971, ch. 191,
§ 3.201(4) (1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 5341 (Mar. 30, 1971)).
2'Idaho Laws 197 1,ch. 299, § 2.207 (1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 5336 (Apr. 13,
1971)).
'"ldaho Laws 197 1,ch. 299, § 3.201(4) (1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 5336 (Apr.
13, 1971)).
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.4 representativePenney chargeaccount showing a comparisonof service charges
computed by the adjustedbalance and beginningbalance methods
Beginning balance
method

Adjusted balance method
Date

PayPurchases ments

(B)

(A)

Nov. 2
S10.00
Nov. 9
S5.46
........
Nov. 29
......
Dec. 2
17.45
......
..
Dec 4
10.00
......
..........
Dec. II
M.... ... .
.. . 4.00
Dec. 22
2.98 ...
Dec. 28
13 90 28.98
Dec. 30 ........ ..........
Jan 2
..
.15.53
..
Jan. 12
.
.1000
Jan 26
Total service charges ...
Effective annual percentage
rate:
..
November
. ..
December
.
....
January
For the 3-month period

.

Beginning
balance

Adjusted
balance

Service
charge-

(D)

(E)

(C)
S28.91
...

..............
.. ..........
$0.28
S1.........S8.91

Service
charge'

(F)

(G)

$28.91
_ _

............ 24.80

24.65

$0.43
......
......

.......

......

...
5.67
......

.....
44.09

.....
.....
. ....
. .....
.09 .......
44.52
....

88

.. .

...

.

15-6
2 9
I1.5
9 5

Service charge computed at a monthly rate of I1 percent.
Credit for returned merchandise.
Source: Penney Account No. 010-002-541-02. November 1965-January 1966.

......
......
37

.67

.51

34.09

...

..

Beginning
balance

....

......
...

1.47

24.0
12.0
15.0
15.7

